The U.S. Treasury has sanctioned BitBank, an Iran-based crypto exchange, over alleged Bitcoin transfers tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The catch: Treasury has not published the wallet addresses, transaction hashes, or a transaction-by-transaction trail to back up the “hundreds of millions” claim.
- Sept. 17 sanctions target BitBank, Pishtaz Simorgh, and three individuals
- Treasury alleges Bitcoin was used to move funds to the IRGC between June and July
- No public blockchain evidence was released for independent verification
- The move expands Washington’s pressure on Iran-linked crypto networks
The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, better known as OFAC, designated BitBank, an Iran-based financial and insurance business established in 2024, along with Pishtaz Simorgh Electronic Trade Company and three individuals tied to financier Babak Zanjani. Treasury says the network used BitBank to move crypto-linked payments in support of Iranian sanctions evasion, echoing concerns flagged in an earlier OFAC warns Iran crypto payments can trigger sanctions notice.
The sanctioned individuals are Hossein Ali Zaker Hossein, Mohammad Mahdi Zaker Hossein, and Seyed Adel Heidari.
Treasury identifies Mohammad Mahdi Zaker Hossein as the chief executive of Pishtaz Simorgh. Seyed Adel Heidari is identified as vice chairman of Dot One’s board. Hossein Ali Zaker Hossein is alleged to have participated in oil exports and digital asset transactions.
The action is part of Treasury’s broader Operation Economic Outcast Disrupts Digital Asset, a sanctions campaign aimed at Iranian financial networks and sanctions evasion. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent put the government’s posture plainly:
“efforts to finance the Iranian regime using cryptocurrencies are not beyond OFAC’s reach.”
That is the core message here: Washington is treating crypto as another rail that can be monitored, disrupted, and frozen when it is used to move sanctioned value. Crypto is not some magical sanctions-proof tunnel. It is a payment layer, and like every other payment layer, it has chokepoints.
But the evidence gap matters.
Treasury alleges BitBank was used to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars in Bitcoin to the IRGC between June and July. That is a serious accusation. It would normally be the kind of claim that benefits from hard public evidence, wallet addresses, transaction hashes, and a clear tracing trail. Treasury did not release that material here, so the figure remains a government allegation, not independently verified on-chain proof.
For readers less familiar with the term, on-chain evidence means public blockchain data that can be traced by anyone with the right tools. If a government publishes wallet addresses or transaction hashes, independent analysts can inspect the flows. Without that, everyone else is basically being asked to take the state’s word for it. Sometimes that is justified. Sometimes it is not. Skepticism is not a crime.
The Treasury notice also ties BitBank to Pishtaz Simorgh Electronic Trade Company, which it says developed BitBank’s digital asset software. That detail matters because it suggests a broader support structure than a lone exchange operator. Treasury’s framing is that this was a network of software, operators, and connected business figures built to keep money moving despite sanctions pressure.
Treasury further links the activity to Babak Zanjani, the Iranian financier whose name has already appeared in earlier U.S. sanctions actions. According to the notice, BitBank sat inside a wider Zanjani-linked network that had already been hit in prior rounds. Treasury previously targeted Zanjani-linked exchanges and businesses, including BitBank faces U.S. sanctions over alleged IRGC Bitcoin, then added additional Zanjani-related entities on July 24.
The pattern is familiar. One exchange gets burned, another pops up with a cleaner logo and the same incentives. Crypto does not erase sanctions risk; it often just changes the packaging.
BitBank also appears in a maritime angle. Treasury says Hormuz Safe Marine Services Authority, which was sanctioned on July 29, used BitBank since June to transfer payments collected for the Iranian government. That widens the picture beyond a single exchange and into the kind of sanctions network Treasury likes to target: shipping, oil, finance, software, and crypto all stitched together.
That connection is what makes this more than a routine exchange designation. Treasury is not just pointing at a trading venue and saying “bad actors used crypto.” It is alleging that crypto sat inside a larger sanctions-evasion stack tied to state-linked commerce. In plain English: the exchange may have been one piece of the plumbing, not the whole house.
Still, the evidence question should not be brushed aside.
OFAC sanctions are administrative actions, not criminal convictions. They can be imposed without a courtroom trial, and they can move fast. That speed is useful when Washington believes it is dealing with hostile networks. It also means the public should be careful about treating every allegation as settled fact when the underlying blockchain proof is not made public.
There is also the compliance machinery around sanctions to consider. OFAC’s 50% rule means entities owned 50% or more by blocked parties can also be treated as blocked, even if they are not named individually. And strict liability means civil sanctions penalties can be imposed without proving intent in the way a criminal case would require. That is great for enforcement. It is also why banks, exchanges, and payment firms tend to move like they have seen a ghost whenever OFAC updates the list.
The broader campaign has been building for months. In June, Treasury sanctioned Iranian exchanges including Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex. On Aug. 7, it added Shelbit and Aban Tether, saying they were involved in transactions linked to previously sanctioned exchanges. On Aug. 24, Treasury launched Treasury sanctions crypto exchanges funding Iran's IRGC. The BitBank action lands inside that same tightening vise, and it follows prior coverage of US Treasury sanctions Iranian crypto exchanges over alleged sanctions evasion and US freezes $344M in Iran-linked crypto as Tether blocks USDT on Tron.
That sequence suggests a sustained pressure campaign, not a one-off move. Washington is clearly trying to map and choke the infrastructure that lets Iranian entities touch global financial rails when conventional banking is off limits. Whether that actually changes behavior over time is the harder question. Sanctions can be effective. They can also become a bureaucratic game of whack-a-mole if the same networks simply rebrand, relocate, or split into smaller pieces.
For the crypto industry, the message is blunt: if a platform is facilitating sanctioned activity, even indirectly, Treasury is willing to go after the exchange, the software developer, the connected business figures, and the surrounding network. For Bitcoin itself, the takeaway is more nuanced. The network is neutral. The people using it are not. Bitcoin does not care who moves value. Governments do.
Key takeaways and quick answers
-
Was BitBank sanctioned by Treasury?
Yes. OFAC designated BitBank on Sept. 17, along with Pishtaz Simorgh Electronic Trade Company and three named individuals tied to the alleged network. -
Did Treasury prove the Bitcoin transfers publicly?
No. Treasury made the allegation, but it did not publish wallet addresses, transaction hashes, or a full tracing trail for independent verification. -
Why does this matter for crypto businesses?
Because sanctions can reach exchanges, software developers, and connected counterparties, not just the obvious front-end platform. -
Is this a criminal conviction?
No. This is a sanctions action, which is administrative and can be imposed without a criminal trial. -
What is the bigger pattern here?
The U.S. is steadily increasing pressure on Iran-linked crypto infrastructure as part of a broader sanctions-evasion campaign.
The real issue is simple: if Treasury has the receipts, show the chain. If it does not, then readers are being asked to accept a serious accusation without the on-chain evidence that would let the public verify it.
Further reading
A useful backdrop for the broader corporate-policy angle:
